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1 Aug 58

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Intelligence Briefing of Mr. Truman, 30 July 1958

1. Because of the plane's late arrival in Kansas City, 4:35 p.m. instead of 3:30 Tuesday, 29 July, which would bring me to Independence later in the afternoon, I called Mr. Truman from the airport and asked if it was convenient for him to receive me as soon as I could get from the airport to the Library or whether he preferred me to come Wednesday morning. Mr. Truman asked me to meet with him at 9:00 the following morning, Wednesday, 30 July, saying that we would then have plenty of time.
2. The briefing session Wednesday morning lasted from 9:00 to 10:20 and took place in Mr. Truman's private office in the Truman Library building. The briefing was very well received.
3. Mr. Truman's interest centered on Near Eastern problems and he read the pertinent section of the prepared briefing in its entirety. He interrupted his reading frequently to ask quick questions, to make comments, and to reminisce about Near Eastern personages. He recognized the sensitive nature of the information contained in the prepared briefing and expressed his appreciation for this information several times, assuring me that he understood the security problems involved.
4. He was particularly interested in our evidence of the UAR's role in the Lebanese situation and in the wide scope of Nassir's clandestine activities. It was his opinion that we would find the Grand Mufti's hand

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in Nassir's machinations and that the Grand Mufti should be kept under watch.

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He read our statement on Israel with great care. Likewise, the pace of his reading slowed down when he came to Kuwait and to the problems of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somaliland. On several occasions Mr. Truman returned to and stressed the danger in Iran, illustrating his discussion by pointing to the Soviet-Iranian border on the large globe which stood by his desk and recalling details of the Soviet incursion in Azerbaijan at the close of World War II. When I remarked that the Shah was afraid to go home after the Iraqi coup Mr. Truman exclaimed that he had guessed as much. The fact that our intelligence supported his guess pleased Mr. Truman.

5. I briefed Mr. Truman orally on the Sino-Soviet problem, for it was apparent that he did not wish to read on in the prepared text but instead wished to talk and ask questions. Where possible I referred him to sections in the text as part of my response to his questions and in this way Mr. Truman read our pages on Indonesia and on Latin America.

6. In general it was apparent from Mr. Truman's comments that he is prepared for more crises bringing bad news not only in the Near East but elsewhere in the world of emerging nationalist states. He voiced the opinion that a generation may pass before these new states and some old

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ones as well, such as those of Latin America, will be sufficiently stable and enlightened to appreciate the danger of Communist totalitarianism.

7. Mr. Truman was obviously pleased to see your "Briefing Notes" for the "Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders," dated July 14, 1958, and thanked you for the opportunity to read them. He read every word and expressed his emphatic agreement with the conclusions.

8. I found an opportunity to show Mr. Truman the Central Intelligence Bulletin for 29 July. He was very interested in the Bulletin's development and recalled his own part in its origin.

9. Mr. Truman would appreciate being briefed whenever a crisis develops on which he may have to comment publicly. I believe he intends to discuss this matter with you. Although I offered to discuss specific arrangements then and there he was disinclined to commit himself to any schedule. It would be very helpful to us if Mr. Truman would agree to take the initiative and call for briefings. This principle governed our relations with Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Kefauver in 1956 and is the best way of avoiding possible misunderstandings, in fact the only way if regular scheduled briefings are not desired.

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Deputy Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence

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